

Hard Werken? Key Factors and Strategies of Dutch Immigrant Entrepreneurial Success in New Zealand

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Principal Topic

Migrant entrepreneurship has grown into a significant topic of research internationally. One major milestone was the 1990 publication 'Ethnic Entrepreneurs – Immigrant Businesses in Industrial Societies', by Roger Waldinger et al. Another watershed moment was the introduction in 2001 of the *mixed embeddedness* concept by Robert Kloosterman and Jan Rath, which initiated a plethora of work (eg in New Zealand: Meares, Cain, & Spoonley, 2011).

'Ethnic Entrepreneurs' was an international team effort that provided a first comprehensive overview of immigrant entrepreneurship, addressed cross-border differences and included an analysis of the *structure* of the environment in which immigrants operate. It took the emphasis away from the immigrant as *agent*, by providing an *interactive model* of ethnic business development that included *Opportunity Structures* and *Group Characteristics*.

The *mixed embeddedness* approach became a burgeoning field of research after Rath and Kloosterman proposed it in 2001 as a model that is complementary to research that focuses merely on the *agency* matters, such as the unique characteristics of immigrant entrepreneurs or their use of ethnic networks and ethnic resources to engage in entrepreneurial activities. *Mixed embeddedness* elaborates on the interplay of *agency* and *structure*, and this approach was further developed by researchers participating in an international, interdisciplinary thematic network (Kloosterman & Rath, 2003, p. xviii). The *mixed embeddedness* approach expands the dimensions of the *interactive model* by addressing additional areas of research, and intends "to take into account the characteristics of the supply of immigrant entrepreneurs, the shape of the opportunity structure, and the institutions mediating between aspiring entrepreneurs and concrete openings to start a business in order to analyse immigrant entrepreneurship in different national contexts." (Kloosterman & Rath, 2003, p. 9)

Two other major publications have recently made a significant effort to analyse the complex phenomenon of migrant entrepreneurship. Leo-Paul Dana covered many different countries and ethnic communities in the 'Handbook of Research on Ethnic Minority Entrepreneurship', including Indian women and Lebanese entrepreneurs in New Zealand

(Dana, 2007). The OECD publication 'Open for Business' covers the main findings of the 2010 'Conference on Migrant Entrepreneurship and Employment Creation of Immigrants' in Paris, which concluded among other key findings that the traditional perception of ethnic businesses operating within their own ethnic environment, in lower segments of the markets, does not hold true. Immigrant entrepreneurship extends beyond ethnic business and contributes to high-value activities and innovation. In the United States, for example, "skilled migrants outperform college-educated natives in terms of starting companies, per-capita patenting, commercialising or licensing patents" (OECD, 2010, p. 17) .

Research into immigrant entrepreneurship is a multi-faceted field of research that is also considered a growing topic of importance in New Zealand. Hunter and Wilson have provided an historic overview – covering 150 years of entrepreneurship in New Zealand – that describes how migrants outperformed native-born New Zealanders in the entrepreneurship numbers stakes. Immigrants were up to twice as likely to become successful entrepreneurs as their fellow citizens in the 19th and 20th century, establishing major companies whether they had English origins (eg Val Barfoot with Barfoot & Thompson), German (eg Bendix Hallenstein with Hallenstein's), Chinese (eg Tom Ah Chee with Foodtown), or Dutch backgrounds (eg Jo La Grouw with Lockwood Homes) (Hunter & Wilson, 2007, p. 300).

De Vries has researched the influence of migration, settlement, cultural and business factors on entrepreneurship among Dutch, Chinese, Indian and Pacific entrepreneurs (De Vries, 2007). Krivokapic-Skoko researched ethnic entrepreneurship in New Zealand agriculture (Krivokapic-Skoko, 2001). Cruickshank has studied intentional immigrant entrepreneurs who apply for residency in countries like New Zealand, Australia and Canada which are intent on attracting experienced business people willing to invest in new business ventures (Cruickshank, 2010).

Dutch immigrants in New Zealand have been a topic of research since Thompson published 'Dutch Migrants in the Economy of New Zealand' (Thompson, 1967). While De Vries studied a generic sample of Dutch immigrant entrepreneurs, several other studies have focused on the Dutch influx into the dairy industry (Van Roon, 1970, and Krivokapic-Skoko, 2001) and their crucial role in the growth of the poultry and horticultural industries (Van Roon, 1970).

This paper will introduce a heuristic immigrant entrepreneurship model that can help describe the typical opportunities, processes and issues faced by migrant entrepreneurs in the new business and economic environment in which they operate and must thrive and survive. It will also help identify entrepreneurs' distinct capabilities and resources that lead them to develop distinct business strategies – different from those of their native counterparts – to develop a unique competitive advantage. The model includes key aspects of the *mixed embeddedness* approach and looks at both *agency* and *structure* dimensions.

The model will be tested against cases of Dutch immigrant entrepreneurship, as documented in secondary sources, to see whether it can be helpful in determining the key factors that led Dutch entrepreneurs to achieve success in a foreign environment.

Building a Comprehensive Model

The Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model outlined below, provides a comprehensive overview of the many factors that influence immigrant entrepreneurs, and includes key concepts that are part of the *mixed embeddedness* approach. It is also connected to Waldinger's *interactive model* by building on the work of Catarina Reis Oliveira who has introduced a heuristic model that links *Group Opportunities* and *Host Society Opportunities* to the *Personal Resources* of entrepreneurs to identify specific *Strategies* that enable them to succeed. The way in which the model (below) explains migrant entrepreneurship from an *agency* as well as a *structure* angle, fits with current views of generic entrepreneurship – both from the *micro* and *macro* perspective – and uses the concepts of *human*, *social* and *cultural capital* to help analyse and identify specific factors in the immigrant's background.

Mixed Embeddedness as the Context for a Migrant Entrepreneurship Model

Kloosterman and Rath perceive the 1990 study published by Waldinger et al. (Waldinger, Aldrich, & Ward, 1990), as the first comprehensive international overview of ethnic entrepreneurship that made an effort to “move beyond actors’ perspectives and address cross border differences” (Kloosterman & Rath, 2003, p. 6) They also point to the shortcomings of Waldinger et al.'s *interactive model* however, which has a number of methodological flaws, lacks awareness of gender issues and racialisation processes, and is more of a classification than an explanatory model that. Their main critique is the “a priori categorization of immigrants as ethnic groups and the concomitant assumption that as ethnic entrepreneurs, immigrants act differently by default than mainstream entrepreneurs” (Kloosterman & Rath, 2003, p. 6). Their argument is that ethnicity should not be the only focal point of analysis.

The key to Kloosterman and Rath's mixed embeddedness approach is to take both the *agency* and the *structure* dimensions into account. Whereas agency matters refer to for example ethnic resources and social networks, structure matters refer to issues such as blocked mobility, contemporary structural changes in advanced economies such as re-structuring and outsourcing, and the growth of a services industry. Mixed embeddedness aims to go “beyond the social embeddedness of the actors themselves and take into account the wider societal context in which immigrant entrepreneurs are starting their business” (Kloosterman & Rath, 2003, p. 8). Any entrepreneur works within a specific opportunity space – the business environment that sets specific parameters for what is possible and likely to be successful. At the same time though, entrepreneurs also must comply with and respond to a wide range of formal and informal institutions that regulate business opportunities or openings, as well as the accessibility of the business environment, to migrant entrepreneurs. This regulation structure is about repression and constraint, just as much as it is about business enablement.

Put succinctly: “The mixed embeddedness approach is intended to take into account the characteristics of the supply of immigrant entrepreneurs, the shape of the opportunity

structure, and the institutions mediating between aspiring entrepreneurs and concrete openings to start a business in order to analyse business entrepreneurship in the context of different national contexts” (Kloosterman & Rath, 2003, p. 9)

The *Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model* below includes these three concepts – *migrant characteristics*; *opportunity structure*; and *regulatory environment*. In addition, the main dimensions from the model of immigrant entrepreneurial strategies by Oliveira will be used, which shares key aspects and part of the structure of Waldinger’s *interactive model*. Oliveira’s model is more recent, and provides more insights and detail in regard to the opportunities offered by the *host society* and the opportunities offered by the *ethnic group* to which the immigrant belongs. Oliveira also identifies the entrepreneur’s *personal resources* as a key agency that influences the immigrants’ entrepreneurial strategies.

The Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model is set up to be a heuristic model, rather than a classification model, a normative model (De Vries, 2007), or a flowchart model (Dana, in Dana, 2007). It should enable greater understanding of the realities of the complex environments in which migrant entrepreneurs make their business ventures succeed through setting out specific strategies that enable them to successfully compete with their native counterparts.

Entrepreneurship Theory as the Context for a Migrant Entrepreneurship Model

Immigrant entrepreneurs cannot just be characterised through their ethnicity. They have to set up and manage their ventures – like any other business person in their host country. Entrepreneurship is often perceived as the formation of new business enterprises or new venture creation, and is usually defined through concepts such as creativity, innovation, risk, creating economic wealth and establishing a new business venture. One succinct definition is: “Entrepreneurship is the creation of an innovative economic organisation for the purpose of gain or growth under conditions of risk and uncertainty” (Dollinger, 2003, p. 5).

Building on historic definitions, Frederick adds a number of additional useful aspects to the concept: “Entrepreneurship is a dynamic process of vision, change and creation. It requires an application of energy and passion towards the creation and implementation of new ideas and creative solutions. Essential ingredients include the willingness to take calculated risks in terms of time, equity, or career; the ability to formulate an effective venture team; the creative skill to marshal needed resources; the fundamental skill of building a solid business plan; and, finally the vision to recognise opportunity where others see chaos, contradiction, and confusion” (Frederick & Kuratko, 2010, p. 11)

In assessing the numerous schools of thought on entrepreneurship, Frederick identifies the *macro* view and the *micro* view (Frederick & Kuratko, 2010). The broadest and most pervasive *macro* views are part of the *social and cultural* school, where the focus is on the socio-political environment that shapes institutions, values and mores, and influences the development of entrepreneurs. Three others in this category include the *financial / capital*, *displacement*, and *ecological* schools of thought. They all present a broad array of factors

that relate to success or failure in entrepreneurial ventures, which “includes external processes that are sometimes beyond the control of the individual entrepreneur for they exhibit a strong external locus of control point of view” (Frederick & Kuratko, 2010, p. 12).

The *micro* view of entrepreneurship examines those factors that are part of the internal locus of control: “The potential entrepreneur has the ability, or control, to direct or adjust the outcome of each major influence” (Frederick & Kuratko, 2010, p. 14). It includes the *entrepreneurial trait* theory, which is most widely recognised and tries to identify success traits, but also the *venture opportunity* school of thought that focuses on creativity and market awareness, and *strategic formulation* which emphasises the planning process.

Just as the *structure* dimensions (opportunity and regulatory environment) of the *mixed embeddedness* approach share similarities with the *macro* view, the *agency* dimensions (migrant characteristics) reflect the *micro* view. A similar approach can be found in Dollinger’s overview of entrepreneurship (Dollinger, 2003, p. 19), which describes four ‘Dimensions of New Venture Creation’: *Individual Characteristics* (or the *micro / agency* view), *Environment*, *Constraints in the Environment*, and *Organisation* (all part of the *macro / structure* view). Key aspects of Frederick’s and Dollinger’s views on entrepreneurship have been accommodated in the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model below.

Concepts of Capital as the Context for an Immigrant Entrepreneurship Model


The concepts of *human*, *social* and *cultural* capital are also used in the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model to describe the *agency* factors that enable immigrant entrepreneurs to deploy successful strategies and create thriving ventures. Cruickshank illustrated the usefulness of these concepts in her analysis of intentional immigrant entrepreneurs. She expected social capital to play a major role in the early stages of settlement, but found that human capital was the significant factor that “enabled migrants to speedily access resources and establish their business.” (Cruickshank, 2010, p. 261)

Cultural capital was originally defined as artefacts of a culture, including language, education, ways of thinking and problem solving (Bourdieu, 1986). These non-financial assets acts as social relations within a system of exchange and promote social mobility beyond economic means – very helpful for newly arrived immigrants.

Social capital relates to resources based on group membership, relationships, networks of influence and support. According to Bourdieu, it is: “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of or more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1986).

Social capital is sometimes perceived as a part of human capital, but is separated out in the model for analytical purposes. *Human capital* refers to the array of competencies like knowledge, creativity, and social and personality attributes that enable individuals to perform and produce economic value.

Fig 1 - Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model



The model ignores most of the micro dimensions that are applicable to all entrepreneurs regardless of ethnicity – such as a propensity for risk taking, creativity and strategic planning – since it aims to identify those characteristics that are pertinent to immigrant entrepreneurs, and the strategies they devise relating to their ethnic background and immigration status.

Entrepreneurship in New Zealand

Historical data covering the period 1840 – 1990, analysed by Hunter and Wilson, shows how immigrants are over-represented in entrepreneurship compared to the general population – in the early years by more than twice the expected numbers. Hunter and Wilson’s analysis points out the rise of alternative entrepreneurial growth strategies, as well as specific financing and industry structures that are unique to the New Zealand business environment. Shortages of start-up capital were often reduced through innovative constructs that minimised capital requirements. Family ownership has been typical. Most entrepreneurs favoured establishing additional firms to expand the scale of their enterprises, rather than acquisitions. Vertical integration strategies were popular, for example with Fletcher Construction and the Lockwood Group, which exploited supply chain advantages through ownership of milling activities, as well as design and construction services (Hunter & Wilson, 2007, p. 307).

Hunter and Wilson refer to classic themes of entrepreneurship such as the importance of networks and association in venture activity, and a typical appetite for risk (Hunter & Wilson, 2007, p. 297). As to the entrepreneurs’ social background, most arose from lower-middle class and middle-class commercial backgrounds, using their expertise and practical industry skills, as well as their commercial skills and networks, to great advantage. Business and other links to their home country were used to establish and conduct trade. Many “saw an opportunity arising in the same industry they were working in that was presently under-exploited or un-exploited, and then, either by themselves, or with a group of people, created an enterprise to pursue this opportunity.” (Hunter & Wilson, 2007, p. 302)

These main features of New Zealand entrepreneurship fit with the Immigrant Entrepreneurship Environment Model – in regard to opportunity, restraints, personality, ability, links to the home country and the strategies that were devised to build a successful business – and they are also characteristic of new Dutch arrivals.

The Dutch in New Zealand

Immigrants from the Netherlands started arriving in New Zealand by the 10,000s in the 1950s and 1960s – and quickly became the country’s largest ethnic community from continental Europe and the largest group from any non-English speaking country. Poot and Van der Pas identify *three distinct cohorts of arrivals*, each spanning some 20 years. The 1950s and 1960s saw the arrival of the *post-war settlers* – most of them young, religious, less educated, often speaking only a little English, and relatively poor. Travel on the Assisted Passage Scheme was subsidised for some 25% of them by the New Zealand Government, on condition that they would work for two years in an allocated job on a bonding scheme.

The early Dutch immigrants integrated so well in New Zealand society – voluntarily, but also under directives from Government and settler assistance organisations in both countries – that they became ‘Invisible Immigrants’, only identifiable through their accent, with their children and following generations losing much of the Dutch language and culture.


Between 1951 and 1968, over 28,000 immigrants born in Dutch territories arrived in New Zealand, and almost 24,000 settled (Thomson, 1967). Thompson outlines the even spread of the Dutch migrants throughout the country in 1970, but notes that “South Auckland – Bay of Plenty, where land development and forestry have initiated an almost explosive expansion of towns and cities, records a slightly higher than normal concentration of Dutch-born. It is largely in the Waikato, too, that Dutch farmers have begun the climb through sharemilking to farm ownership. ... while those centres where industrial development is rapid have attracted a disproportionate share of the total.” (Thomson, 1967, p. 99).

In an overview of the social status of the Dutch migrants, Thomson comments specifically on the construction industry. “There are numerous examples of men from other occupations starting as builder’s labourers and, in a remarkably few years, working their way through to the independence and relative affluence of managing their own building business. ... Some of the progress is what may be regarded as a normal advancement through the national employment mill, but the dimensions and speed of Dutch advancement can only be explained as another expression of the same ambition, initiative and sense of adventure that encouraged emigration a decade or more earlier” (Thomson, 1967, p. 101). In the retail trade, Thomson calculates that some 20 per cent were owners or managers before emigration, whereas in 1964 some 50 per cent owned the establishment they operated. (Thomson, 1967, p. 103).

The 1970s and 1980s saw the second cohort arriving – the *skilled migrants*. The last two decades are the era of the *transnationals* – highly qualified, socially mobile and working as highly skilled professionals. (Poot & Van der Pas, 2011, p. 14).

The number of residents of Dutch ancestry (including non-Dutch partners) – or the ‘Dutch community’ – is estimated at 116,700 or 2.7% of the population (Poot & Van der Pas, 2011, p. 22). Today, some 1500 New Zealand student permits, work permits and permanent residencies are issued to Dutch citizens per annum (Poot & Van der Pas, 2011, p. 16).

Pegge has made an attempt to assess to some degree the contribution of Dutch migrants to the New Zealand economy, and focuses on labour market participation. An analysis of the 2002 Census results shows that Dutch immigrants have a high rate of becoming employers (8.0%) and self-employed (16.1%). The figures are even higher for non-recent Dutch immigrants (23.5% and 12.6%). This compares favourably to British figures (3.2% and 10.2%), other European immigrant numbers (4.4% and 13.7%) and New Zealand average figures of 7.8% employers and 12.1% self-employed (Pegge, 2006, p. 27).



The Dutch Entrepreneurship Experience – A Fit with the Model?

Ask any Dutch man or woman why the Dutch migrants were economically successful in New Zealand, and they will say: “Hard werken!” Working hard was the hallmark of the ‘Industrious Dutchy’. They came from a highly competitive, densely populated nation that had just lived through austerity during the depression and had survived food shortages and deprivation under a Nazi Germany occupation during which some 200,000 people had died, so that should come as no surprise. The new arrivals were driven by a traditional strong work ethic, and keen to succeed in their new home country, often spurred on by the simple fact that they only had the meagre sum of a few pounds in their wallet and a small suitcase with minimal belongings in their hands, as they found temporary accommodation in what we today would call refugee camps.

Schouten tells a story that’s typical of the culture clashes experienced by many Dutch workers who encountered unionism and more lax Kiwi work attitudes. According to Jan Okkerse: “Many a time I was told to slow down. At one stage the men went to the manager and said you either get that Dutchman out or we go out. ... The men also used to make their own overtime. They would say ‘Slow down Jan, slow down, overtime tonight.’ ... They had it down to a fine art, appearing to be busy doing nothing. That’s an art, I couldn’t do that.” (Schouten, 1992, p. 151)

No Dutch Community to Fall Back On

One other important characteristic of the Dutch migrants fitting into New Zealand society was that they were discouraged from grouping together. This meant they could not easily support each other. There simply were no Dutch enclaves. The Dutch and New Zealand

Governments of the day had devised a policy to spread Dutch immigrants far and wide into all corners of the country (Schouten, 1992, pp. 72, 121), to prevent clustering and promote assimilation and integration. In the language of the day, the authorities aimed for: “control of employment to ensure that the [Dutch] alien does not live or work in a foreign cell [or community]” (Schouten, 1992, p. 72). Right from day one, Dutch migrant businesses had to survive in a New Zealand mainstream environment, without having the safety blanket of co-ethnic dependency or an ‘ethnic economy’ (Light & Gold) that characterises later waves of Korean (Meares, Ho, Peace, & Spoonley, 2010) and Chinese migrants (Meares, Cain, & Spoonley, 2011) – who could exert more de facto economic control in their own ethnic domain based on numbers, clustering, ethnic markets, co-ethnic employment, and organisation.

Social Capital is in general an important influencer of migrant entrepreneur strategies. Rath and Kloosterman comment on some of the research that was done in the 1990s, which focused heavily on: “ethnic loyalties and ethnic markets [that] are assumed to be the hallmark of immigrant entrepreneurship” (Rath & Kloosterman, 2000, p. 663). Their emphasis is on going beyond ethnicity and the *agency* perspective, by also taking the societal context into account, since migrants are embedded in a host nation’s various social and economic structures. This is of great importance in the case of Dutch migrant entrepreneurs, as their business behaviour and strategies cannot be characterised or explained purely through ethnic hallmarks. When they arrived here during the migration waves of the 1950s, 1960s and later, Dutch entrepreneurs could not produce goods and services strictly for their own community of fellow Dutch migrants, or rely heavily on the social capital provided by a cohesive, distinct ethnic community.

Individual Case Example 1 – Suzy van der Kwast

One woman who found her way in New Zealand mainstream society from day one, and who made quite a name for herself, was Suzy van der Kwast. The theme of working hard keeps re-emerging in the story of the ‘queen of the Wellington coffee houses’ in the 1960s and 1970s. She sold her first cafe ‘The Windmill’ in 1964, after three years of working up to 18 hours a day, seven days a week, without any holidays, and it earned her £5,000. After that she opened the iconic Suzy’s Coffee Lounge, where she and her partner Tom performed a blistering routine of long hours and highly polished efficiency until the cafe was closed down to make way for the magnificent Majestic Centre in Willis Street, in 1987, with Tom making a few million in the process from his visionary real estate dealings.

But there was much more to Suzy’s success than Dutch work ethic. She chose a European architect to design her coffee bar. At a time when immigrants were shocked at how little choice there was in regard to furnishings and fittings in this country, Erwin Winkler and Fritz Eisenhofer decided to create it all themselves. “Every chair, table, counter, light, fitting and floor covering for their commercial commissions had to be designed and custom made.” (Goldsmith, 2010, p. 167) Their designs were eye-catching and crafted to make a statement in what was, at the time, a generally dismal city environment. For Suzy’s, the result was

stylish and stunning, and included a vibrant striped carpet, a huge copper art work, and a window in blue, green and yellow in the style of contemporary Dutch painter Mondriaan. “The overall effect was to be clean and uncluttered with modern lines, and the ‘horizontals, verticals and triangulars’, so admired later by artist Rita Angus [who immortalised the atmosphere in a painting], were allowed to shine” (Goldsmith, 2010, p. 167)

But Suzy took style, sophistication and innovation to even higher levels. The food was to be fresh and healthy, served from a salad bar, with salad combinations of apple / walnut and carrot / raisin (unheard of!), accompanied by croquettes and a range of European sausages and salamis. But most of all – the coffee was unique. Suzy worked for six weeks, swilling and swallowing, with the technicians at the Faggs coffee roasters in Cuba Street to create the perfect blend. She would add a pinch of salt – the Dutch way – to brew coffee in strictly monitored glass Cona pots, and any coffee that had stood for a few minutes too long was ruthlessly thrown away. Dutch delicacies like appleflaps were baked, and other delights were ordered from Dutch friends at Hollandia Bakeries.

Staff were informed in no uncertain but friendly terms about the importance of keeping the ashtrays clean, and keeping the place running smoothly. Suzy was such an excellent manager, demanding the highest service levels, that Air New Zealand would send its cabin crews to her as part of their training (Goldsmith, 2010, p. 197). And at all times, Suzy would look stunning. “It was the era of James Bond and The Avengers. Suzy was an amalgam of Pussy Galore and Emma Peel in her skinny, cat-suit or tight, shiny pants worn with high, cowboy style gold and silver boots.” (Goldsmith, 2010, p. 200)

So what made Suzy an exceptional entrepreneur? And can the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model help explain her success? Sure, she was an entrepreneur in the typical sense. She had been groomed by an entrepreneurial father who dabbled in real estate and set up a retail business to get away from the drudgeries of farm life. She had the right spirit, the creativity and the mind-set to take risks and spot opportunities. In a personal conversation (2012) she told me, straight after the formal introductions were over: “Het geld lag hier voor het oprapen.” (It was so easy to make money here.)

But was the success of her coffee lounge attributable to her Dutch migrant status and concomitant unique business strategies as well? Below are some more cases to help assess key factors in migrants’ entrepreneurial success.

Individual Case Example 2 – Willem Verryt

The author first met Willem Verryt in the early 1980s, through a friend, and at that time he conveyed the incredible story of his involvement in the resistance movement in German-occupied Netherlands, and how they had set up a prison camp for German soldiers during wartime, hidden in the one of the forests in the south. The war featured big in his memories, and to a fellow Dutchman he could talk about things he hadn’t told his children. Years later he would write a book, “The War Determined Our Destiny” (Verryt, 1991), to

make up for that omission. By then, he had also become the founding father of 'Ons Dorp' (Our Village), a state of the art retirement village in Henderson, Auckland.

Willem's history once more illustrates how an energetic spirit is required to be successful as an entrepreneur. His family ran a top building business, with his dad working six 10-12 hour days a week. While employed in the business from the age of 14, Willem studied five years of tech drawing through evening classes and correspondence school, followed by a three year commerce diploma. A course that would have made him a building inspector was interrupted by the war. Willem was highly involved in the boy scout movement, and a local business association where he quickly achieved leadership positions. He also was a member of a theatre group. When war loomed, he joined the air raid defense service as a volunteer. During the war, Willem became one of the heroes of the Dutch resistance through his actions, leadership and daring bravery, and narrowly escaped execution as he was taken prisoner and tortured by the local equivalent of the Gestapo.

The New Zealand years also tell of tenacity and initiative in adversity. Willem started out briefly as a builder, but after three months in the country became self-employed as his employer offered him a contract with a laying price per 1000 bricks. Soon he could employ labourers to help out. Four years later, in 1955: "I wanted the business to expand and had the knowledge, ability and ambition to see it through. As in Holland I wanted to get into commercial property, churches, schools etc. ... I had already taken on four carpenters...,and the bricklayers were divided in two gangs" (Verryt, 1991, p. 144). Willem had the backing of a local real estate agent, but the tendering process thwarted his efforts, with his quotes too high and not having enough of a network or a reputation. He nearly went bankrupt and decided to quit the building business. In 1957 he bought a motel in Coromandel township, with Dutch friends operating a restaurant in the dining room. Revenues stayed too low, so he moved back to Auckland and the building business, where back problems forced him to take on property management roles and set up a cleaning business.

Willem's strong points were his social skills, his networking abilities and his care for fellow human beings. He proudly talked about upskilling and working with a Maori labourer. His business dealings came about through his manifold contacts. He kept the links with his war buddies alive. He recounted how once he linked into the Auckland Dutch club, he and his wife were never lonely again. He was a socially oriented guy with a feel for community.

His big moment arrived in 1976 when he went back to the Netherlands to explore the idea of setting up a retirement village. On an earlier visit home in 1971 he had seen a beautiful modern example with a service centre, restaurant and bars, lounges, meeting rooms and a large hall, and he wanted to replicate that revolutionary system in New Zealand. He knew he had a captive market among the many Nederlanders in West Auckland.

Apart from inspiration and knowledge, he also received funding from the Netherlands, and with the help of his network of Dutch contacts – friends, Dutch society members, business contacts and Dutch Government representatives – he set up 'Dutch Village - Ons Dorp',

primarily for Nederlanders. The official opening of the multi-million project was in 1984, and all 90 units were completed in 1986, whereas the entertainment pavilion opened in 1989, which today also features healthcare services. Ons Dorp became a shining success story with long waiting lists, and the concept was replicated by New Zealand organisations throughout the country, and by other Dutch groups through the Netherville and Tasman Village retirement villages in the Waikato.

Individual Case Example 3 – Bert ten Broeke

There was more to Willem Verryt's success than typical entrepreneurial characteristics like tenacity, energy and drive though. As will be discussed below, his networks – mainly Dutch – and his ability to draw on and involve other people's resources played a key role in his success.

When it comes to being a driven, dynamic personality, Willem is easily matched by Bert ten Broeke, who established Brook's Smallgoods as a leading specialty meats company in Porirua, providing the nation with previously unknown European delicacies. Like Willem, Bert also survived the Second World War – including an escape from the *Arbeitseinsatz* (forced labour) in Germany at the age of 19 – through cunning and persistence. Instead of making networks and community his main focus though, as Willem did, Bert was a strong individual who was not afraid of alienating people and telling them straight to their face what he stood for, if he thought he was in his rights or justice was at stake. He would have no hesitations whatsoever in speaking his mind, regardless of whether his opponents were in positions of authority – such as Dutch collaborators with the German regime during the war, or employers, union officials or Government inspectors once he arrived in New Zealand. He also was prepared to take them on physically – even if they were twice his size or if it was a situation of several against one. He was not exactly huge in terms of stature, but definitely in terms of staunch personality. In the New Zealand of the 1950s and 1960s he would have been the archetypical direct Dutchman who would speak his mind, and who would be considered as rude and arrogant by the average Kiwi.

Bert was destined to become a butcher, like his father who killed the animals in the butchery while Bert and the other kids would be watching. He virtually grew up in a shop that produced and sold meat, sausages, black pudding, liver sausages, salamis and other continental small goods or delicatessen meats, while ham and bacon were cured in the smokehouse. When Bert was 12 and he got into too much mischief, his dad made him work in the butcher shop. Standing on a foot stool, he had to bone pork loins for roasts, with the tip of the knife, as his father had shown him. Eventually he became very good at boning, spending an hour after school each day in the shop. A German butcher for whom he had to work during the war would still comment on it and praise him some 40 years later during a nostalgic visit. At the age of 14 Bert decided to leave school and become a butcher, so he went to night school to learn book-keeping, while his father taught him the trade when Bert wasn't doing the customer rounds on his bicycle, taking orders and delivering the meats.

After that first butcher training by his father, more was to follow. Hitler's troops conquered

the country in 1940, and Bert ended up working in a butchery in Germany where he learned about German tastes, techniques and tricks of the trade. After the war he went to butchery school in the Netherlands where he learned the art of making a range of Dutch sausages to perfection, and how to present meats in artful ways. Over the years, Bert had turned himself into an expert in the profession, and it turned out he was miles ahead of all the other students and even some of the teachers, with whom he would wholeheartedly disagree if he thought there was a better way of doing things.

Money was always at the front of Bert's mind. During the early years of the war, he had to slaughter animals for the German troops in the local abattoir, and would slip animal fat into his overalls which would melt and run into his gumboots. He would collect up to eight kilos a day, sell it in 500 gram packs and make more money from those sales than from his day job. On early Sunday mornings he and a friend would take 300 eggs to Amsterdam and sell them on the black market, trying to avoid German controls, earning a week's wages every trip. He also would deal in cheese, potatoes, wheat and barley. (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 20, 21) Years later, on the day of his departure, his father asked him what he was going to do – marry a Dutch or a New Zealand woman. "I looked at him for a few minutes and replied that I would marry a New Zealand girl: if I married a Dutch girl, she might get homesick and cost me a few thousand guilders. But if I married a New Zealand girl, I would have my in-laws close by and if the girl gets homesick it would only cost me a few guilders!" (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 69)

Butchers were no longer able to slaughter their own animals in the Netherlands after the war, and Bert resented that. That was where the money was, and it irritated his independent spirit. Being restless, he decided to emigrate. Upon arrival in Auckland by flying boat from Sydney, in 1950, he had £7 in his back pocket and found a job as a butcher within hours, and a B&B that cost £1/10sh a week. "I was taken to the boning floor and met the foreman. My work was to bone the whole beef forequarters. In Holland we would take the bones out of the meat, but here it was the opposite, the meat was taken off the bone unevenly, which produced lots of waste. Most fellows would not have lasted one hour in a butcher shop in Holland... The heart, liver, tongue and ready cleaned tripe were delivered in large trays, but about 80 percent went straight back in sacks to the boiling room with all the bones – what a terrible waste of good food. After only a few hours in the country I could see that my future would be in the sausages and salami trade... Meat in Holland was very expensive and labour was cheap. Here the meat was cheap and labour was expensive... In Holland we hardly had time for lunch. After lunch, the foreman approached me and hinted, 'Go into lower gear'." (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 75)

After Auckland, Bert worked in a butcher shop in Hamilton, and then a freezing works. In his spare time he met up with other Dutch migrants, played soccer and helped a Dutch flatmate who worked in a bakery and saw opportunities in the chocolate trade, making sweets the European way in his spare time. The two of them would produce liqueur-filled chocolates after-hours in their kitchen. Bert of course spotted other opportunities to make money as well in the freezing works, where the boys would all take a taxi to the Waikato Brewery to

get their own cartons of beer. He organised one of his mates who owned a car to buy the beer that he would stock up in his room and sell at a decent profit. (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 98)

When the freezing works closed for the season, Bert went south and ended up working for Huttons in Ngauranga Gorge, in the Smallgoods Department, making sausages in a team of eight. Within a few days he got the knack of doing things in the required way, and when the manager complained to the team about the ongoing problems with the casings bursting during the cooking process or the strings coming off, Bert offered to tie and loop the casings on contract at his boarding house. "We agreed on 5 shillings per 200 casings, tied and looped. The manager sent me plenty of casing and string by truck to my boarding house. I had learnt the tying and looping in Germany and could do 20 in one minute. I did 10,000 in the first week. The manager had asked me if I was working on the casing all night? I did not let on, just smiled. After a while, he wanted to cut the price. I told him, 'A deal is a deal, return the work to the girls and suffer the breakages.' I could see he was very happy with my work, but unhappy with the amount he agreed to pay me." (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 105)

After some time at Hutton's Bert did a stint at a butcher shop, while joining the Butcher's Federation where he collected books and magazines about the manufacture of salami and other smallgoods. He obviously made a good impression there and through that network was put in touch with a start-up smallgoods factory in Whanganui, which needed a manager. He was hired and started a little while later. "The factory had to start from scratch, with casings and spices, beginning with sausages, saveloys and luncheon. The traveller [supplier] called with a variety of spices and casings and slowly different sorts of continental sausage were created." (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 114)

Things went well for Bert. He joined the local soccer team and the local volunteer fire brigade, went dancing regularly with the woman who was to become his future wife, and enjoyed the work. Smallgoods were sold all over, from Palmerston North to Taranaki and the Hutt Valley. "In those days there were many immigrants arriving from Holland, eager to buy Dutch smallgoods. Ken tried several times to obtain my recipes. I had them all in my head, nothing on paper. He knew the meat types, but not the spices, the most important part." (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 119) In the end, protecting his intellectual property was so important to Bert that he decided to leave his job to protect it for himself. "The boss wanted me to write down all the smallgoods recipes. I replied, 'I will be here every day and get ready the seasoning required for the smallgoods.' Next, we were arguing and he stated, 'Nobody is indispensable.'... So I left." (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 120)

By that time he had promised the family of his future wife, who were concerned that he was just a butcher with limited means to provide for her, that "when I turned forty, I would have my own salami factory, a large house on a hill with cattle grazing on my land, a red Mercedes sports car and forty thousand pounds in the bank. I was given a funny look and was told I was dreaming." (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 119) But Bert's ambition and drive led him to achieve exactly that.

A butcher shop was bought in Wellington, close to Courtenay place. At first the turnover was minimal, so Bert informed an old Dutch soccer buddy who worked for the Dutch Embassy that he was in business, “and news spread very quickly among the Dutch community”. (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 122) There were more Dutch links that Bert took advantage of. During a trip back home he employed another Dutch butcher to take care of the business, and in the Netherlands he collected more recipes for continental goods (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 126). One of his oldest friends in the country, who was a plumber, built him a smokehouse, and “nearly all the Dutchies from Wellington bought their meat and smallgoods from our shop” (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 127) The Embassy contacts helped to bring in customers, with the American Ambassador and “the German, Swiss, Belgian and Dutch diplomats purchasing their meat from us” (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 127).

Another shop was opened in Tinakori and as regular customers left Wellington and word spread, people from throughout the region wanted Bert’s meats. All they had to do was find a delicatessen in town, and he would send them a price list. “That is how I started my smallgoods business. After a while I started to take trips to Whanganui, Taranaki, Manawatu and Hawkes Bay and back through the Wairarapa.” (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 128) When the two shops became too small, a third was leased in Johnsonville with a backyard and sheds. All this happened in a space of four years. But Bert still had to achieve his dream.

“I started pushing the continental smallgoods very hard. I even had a few shops in Auckland who were purchasing them.” (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 129) The Woolworths shops in the lower half of the South Island were next. “The salamis and liver sausages were becoming very popular at parties. The Johnsonville butcher shop had one man working behind the counter, while four of us were making smallgoods. We were taking most orders from the boot of the car. After a year we bought a van, a Ford.” (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 132) A little later, Bert was approached by a distributor who wanted to export and soon a tonne of smallgoods would leave the Wellington wharf every month.

Being virtually first in the small goods trade, Bert got a lot of the meat he required for free or at greatly reduced prices since its value went undetected. He would collect unsold pigs heads from butcheries in Wellington, and on Fridays he would visit the abattoir, bring a couple of boxes of beer for the workers and load up his van to the max with tripe, liver, tongue, heart, kidneys and fat, scraps from the chillers and leftovers the butchers did not want. He also had a keen eye for quality, and always made sure that the suppliers of his regular meat were the best in the business.

Just as he was extremely sharp with choosing his meat suppliers, Bert was also careful to the utmost with planning the outlay for his first factory. It had to fit with export specifications, and needed to work at the highest levels of efficiency, so that no time, effort, or heating and cooling energy would be needlessly wasted. Bert had gained experience in so many outfits in Europe and New Zealand – including a trip to Belgium during his butcher’s training – that it came naturally to him.

The cool parts of the factory were on one side – the freezer, chillers for the various smallgoods, meats and bacon, and the refrigeration units – and they all had plenty of space around them to keep air circulating and give repair men access without interrupting the production processes. The hot parts were on the other side – like the drying room, boiler, smokehouse and cooking vessels. In the middle was Bert's office, with double glazing all around, so that he could keep a watchful eye on everything. Apart from the smoko room, the factory had no outside windows, and everything was lit by fluorescent lights. He wanted the walls lined with aluminium sheets and the floors at one level, sloping to the centre drain covered with galvanised steel covers. All Bert's knowledge that he had gathered over the decades was brought together in that design, and it probably was the most advanced smallgoods factory New Zealand had ever seen.

The Master Butchers opened a new smallgoods factory around the same time, which according to a disappointed Bert had a number of flaws, so he invited the directors over to his place. "They looked overwhelmed, and could see the difference between their and my factory. They were very impressed. I had told them I did not need a loan from the bank, it had all been paid for in cash. I even had an offer from the Dutch Embassy of a loan, but I did not need their help. The only negative opinion was that the factory was too big. I explained that I had no intention of altering the premises in ten years time as to do this would be much too expensive." (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 140)

Bureaucracy tried to put plenty of barriers in his way, but with his Dutch directness and brawn he told an interviewing team of six experts from the Agriculture Department to stick it where the sun don't shine, carried a grumpy Health Inspector out of the factory by his trousers and his coat, cunningly thwarted Union efforts to unionise his workers, and made the Food Department pay if they wanted to collect and test samples. In his analysis, civil servants were good on the attack, but not on the defence. And that approach worked for him. Brook's eventually would get all its approvals, plus a highly coveted export licence.

As a result of all the investments, more and more supermarkets – which were popping up all over the country in those days – wanted to sell his smallgoods. An agent was hired in Auckland who collected orders and phoned them through. An arrangement with the Porirua station master and an Auckland carrier meant that "an Auckland order taken early Monday morning was delivered in the shops before lunch time next day. Customers told us they could get an order faster from Brook's than any other order from the local firms." (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 153) Bert also pressed his staff hard to always deliver – quickly.

Innovation and higher production levels were also at the top of Bert's mind. "I decided to invest in more automatic machinery and an automatic slicer and started packing our goods in airtight packets." (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 153) He experimented with packaging and different kinds of meats, including veal, which took sales to yet other higher levels. By the late 1970s, "there were about 40,000 Dutch immigrants in New Zealand, and they all wanted good Dutch smallgoods, and even the New Zealand population started eating salami, liversausage and all the products we made. We had a staff of 16... We started slicing

and packing different salamis in packs of 100 grams for the supermarkets. That way it was much easier for the customers who could see what they were getting. The salami sales doubled overnight, as did the liversausage, which was packed in 250 gram packs. We could see the trend for more prepackaged goods.” (Ten Broeke, 2010, p. 181)

Brook’s did so well that Bert sold the company in 1980 to Crown Consolidated. He was 56, and quite happy to spend more time with his family on his multi-million dollar farm, close to Whanganui where his wife’s family lived.

Individual Case Examples – Overview

The story of Dutch migrants spotting opportunities in food (Verkerks and Brook’s specialty meats, Vogels bread, deWinkel yoghurt, Mercer and Meyer cheeses), the building industry (Lockwood Homes and many others), farming (dairy, Turk and Brinks chicken), horticulture (new Royal Gala apple variety), floriculture (tulips, calla lilies), hospitality (fine dining, coffee) and clothing (Rembrandt suits, T&T) are illustrated in ‘Tasman’s Legacy’. The book was published in 1992 to celebrate the arrival of the legendary seafarer 350 years earlier as he sailed along the East Coast of the South and North Island. A journalist at the Dominion, Hank Schouten documented the migration waves of the 1950s and 1960s and profiled a number of community leaders, artists, sports people and successful entrepreneurs.

Henk Knottenbelt was the Dutch immigration attaché for almost 30 years – responsible for spreading the Dutch evenly throughout the country. Forming groups was thought to impede successful assimilation into Kiwi society. Henk remembers: “the Dutch were given opportunities they would never have had in the Netherlands. With initiative, hard work and thrift they set up homes and businesses and in turn gave their children the chance to succeed in ways undreamt of in post-war Europe” (Schouten, 1992, p. 117). He helped some 15,000 people settle. “I told them this was a place where you could knit your own pattern in your own life. There is plenty of space and opportunity and if, for example, you are a good painter and qualified, in no time you can be your own boss” (Schouten, 1992, p. 119).

John Krijnen helped set up the Settlers Investment Society, after he heard from another Dutchman who worked for Philips of the deplorable fate of some of the Dutch settlers on farms, living with their families in leaky fowl houses. He knew what that felt like. It had taken him two years to get a mortgage for a house, with returned soldiers and Maori getting help first, only because he got a contact in the Government housing agency State Advances Corporation. The two talked to the Dutch Government and with help from Philips and the New Zealand Government, the Settlers Investment Society was born in the mid-1950s.

“In his free time [John] went round to the Dutch and later New Zealand farmers to tell them there was help available for those who were fair dinkum” (Schouten, 1992, p. 125). He did the work as a volunteer for the love of his fellow men. “John also helped save a few marriages and as a strong Christian he did his utmost to help those people. Poverty, not knowing the language and culture shock could break people sometimes” (Schouten, 1992, p. 125). For 25 years the Society played its role, helping some 1500 families into a home, while

in the 1960s mortgages were also made available to Dutch businesses – but only to those who could prove they would add something new to the New Zealand scene.

One reason for poverty among the new arrivals was that the Dutch Government's foreign exchange control regulations strictly limited the amounts of money settlers could take with them – 50 pounds for each adult, and 20 pounds for each child, at a time when the average wage was 10 pounds a week. One way for wealthier settlers to get around this, was to bring lots of possessions and even pre-fabricated houses.

Their continental European heritage enabled the Dutch to see opportunities and markets that were invisible to the Kiwis and the Brits. Han Klisser was a salesman who was trying to find his way, when a Dutch chef in a Wellington hotel told him that the bakery business held immense promise. Klisser worked for German baker Reizenstein in Ponsonby to produce rye bread, then started for himself and dabbled with wholemeal bread and Swedish milk bread, which could be sold with higher profit margins than the price-controlled standard loaves of bread. He also had to overcome opposition from competitors who filed a law suit under Sunday trading law, to try and to prevent him from making Sunday bread. Finally Klisser settled on the high fibre Vogel bread that he had seen selling well in Sydney. He made a fortune and created a Kiwi icon in the process.

Otto Groen was determined to introduce fine dining in Auckland, enhanced by serving high-margin top German and French wines. He had to fight the big breweries and the liquor laws, and the Gourmet restaurant in Shortland Street was raided a number of times by the police. It took years of fighting, lobbying and paying fines, before the Gourmet became New Zealand's first licensed restaurant in 1961, forever changing the traditional scene of dining rooms attached to pubs – stiff, formal affairs with basic menus, serving beer.

Aalt Verkerk was a butcher, who also made a huge change to the country's eating habits. He was astounded by what he saw when he arrived. "When I saw the meat here I saw the world was wide open and it was all so cheap. New Zealanders ate a tremendous amount of meat, but it was eaten as just food or fuel rather than for enjoyment" (Schouten, 1992, p. 208). Starting work for another butcher first, who was keen for Verkerk to start producing sausages and rosbief (horse meat) for the growing Dutch community in Christchurch, Aalt started out for himself four years later, in 1956. Twenty years later, demand for his specialty meats finally took off when the supermarkets put Verkerks on their shelves. Just like LaGrouw with Lockwood invested in forests and wood processing, Verkerk chose for vertical integration. He invested in a farm, got involved with slaughterhouses, established cool stores and freezers, set up a wholesale butchery, and a factory making traditional fare such as bacon, ham and sausages, as well as rookworst, leverworst and salamis.

Does Dutch Migrant Entrepreneurship Fit the Model?

The Case Examples above can be matched to the various dimensions in the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model, to help identify a number of success factors that

contributed to Dutch migrant entrepreneurs' business success in New Zealand. In this way, the Model can work as a tool to create structure from a plethora of data.

Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model – Success Factors Analysis			
	Suzy van der Kwast	Willem Verryt	Bert ten Broeke
Human Capital Developed in Home Country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked in retail • Started veggies door-to-door sales. • Learned to source product and run / grow a business. • Learned to invest. Started selling with a box tied by string around her neck. Upgraded quickly to a hired bicycle and then earned enough to buy a motorised cycle and trailer as veggie cart. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education and training as a builder • Work experience • Aptitude for initiative • Skills with team work and group participation • Volunteer work and leadership roles • Resistance roles and army management experience after the war 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trained butcher • Trained in abattoir • Commercial training • Adopted different styles and techniques – in different countries • Exposed to hardship – Driven to survive, save money, and pay by cash instead of through loans • Learned to make money by spotting and exploiting market opportunities • Continued professional development all through his career – self-taught • Developed and fiercely protected Intellectual Property • Learned about hard work, creating efficiencies and solving problems in harsh, competitive environment • Competed ruthlessly in sports – combat, soccer, athletics
Social Capital In Home and Host Country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partners in Windmill and Suzy's were both Dutch. • Suppliers (Hollandia Bakeries) and some key staff were Dutch. • Designers – who helped create her brand – were European. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed networks, by joining Dutch Club. Helped friends with building projects, who returned the favour • Set up the Ons Dorp Trust committee of Dutch contacts, and initiated Friendly Support Network for the elderly • Received \$100,000s in funding from networks and organisations in the Netherlands • Received support from Dutch corporates like KLM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employed Dutch butchers • Brother and cousin as business partners • Sold to Dutch migrant community • Used local Dutch contacts to build and promote the business • Used Dutch plumber friend to set up smokehouse at butchery • Used contacts in the Netherlands to develop recipes and products
Cultural Capital From Home Country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Everything about Suzy's was Dutch or continental European – from food to coffee, and from values to sense of style. • Introduced sophistication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exposure to Dutch trends in care for the elderly • Status as resistance / wartime hero • Style and confidence in dealing with people 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Used continental techniques, recipes and styles to create specialty meats • Exposure to European trends

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> into a service industry Knew the public would enjoy / share her taste and sense for trends 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exposure to European ways of setting up meat processing facilities, and different ways of working Exposure to different philosophy of using meat Gave the Brook's brand a continental feel
Constraints and Regulations Host Country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To start the Windmill, Suzy needed £5,000. MARAC Finance didn't want to give it because she could not provide a 'guarantee'. In the end she got a mortgage at 28% interest p.a. Getting building consent for Suzy's was a big issue. The unusual design posed a major hurdle. Tom was issued a ridiculous fine that in his Dutch stubborn way he refused to pay. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of capital Lack of trust from Kiwi counterparts Not enough knowledge of the local building scene Probably discrimination, possibly through lack of language / communication skills 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Difficulties with various Government departments – eg health inspector accusing him that caraway seed was mouse shit Difficulty with getting export license Difficulty to get factory consent for designs (wanted aluminium sheeting on walls, was told he couldn't, then afterwards was told he needed aluminium) Issues with banks Union issues
Opportunity Structure Host Country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The food and hospitality industry in the day was bland and boring. A number of European style cafes had sprung up in Wellington, including French Maid / Chez Lilly. Waitressing was what Suzy wanted to do – at the highest professional level – unheard of. Suzy's flourished in the fledgling industry and became instrumental in starting off New Zealand's coffee culture. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insights into building trends Exposed to concepts of more holistic care for the elderly Introduced new ideas into New Zealand Saw the opportunity of a greying population, which included some 50,000 Dutch immigrants with specific issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited variety of available meat products Absence of a specialty meats market Growing middle class with disposable income Growing interest in finer tastes and other cultures' cuisine The new phenomenon of supermarkets, eager for more fancy foods Plentiful and cheap availability of surplus meat, and the kinds of 'waste' products used in smallgoods

Using the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model as a guideline, key success factors for Dutch entrepreneurs can easily be identified and listed in an ordered way. It works for the more detailed case studies, but it also works when there is only limited information available, as in Schouten's work which takes a broad-brush approach.

Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model – Success Factors Analysis	
Human	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Verkerk: trained butcher La Grouw (Lockwood): architect, engineer, building contractor

Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Veltman (Rembrandt suits): craftsman tailor • Klisser: door-to-door sales of knick-knacks during the war
Social Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Groen: Employ Dutch staff as waiters (sing songs at night to entertain guests) • La Grouw: Dutch business partner / Employ family in the business • Verkerk: Set up family business • Klisser: Employ Dutch bakers (sourced through immigration attaché Knottenbelt)
Cultural Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La Grouw: Use European building system and designs • Groen: Exposure to European trends • Veltman: Continental sophistication and style • Verkerk: Different attitude to meat as a delicacy
Constraints and Regulations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All: Lack of access to capital • Groen: Liquor laws / Duopoly in the liquor industry / Unfair competition • Klisser: Unfair competition / Sunday Trading laws / Health and food regulations
Opportunity Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Groen: Absence of fine dining / Service concepts lacking • Verkerk: Absence of specialty meats / Growing interest in finer taste and other culture's cuisine • La Grouw: Booming building industry / Growing upper middle class interested in quality design and housing • Klisser: Limited variety in breads / Demand for healthier options

The Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model provides a structure that helps to make sense from the available data. The key factors however, describe the entrepreneur's resources and capabilities, and only give indication as to *why* these Dutch entrepreneurs could make an impact. In themselves, the key factors can't explain *how* the newcomers – in adverse circumstances - built sustainable and successful businesses, which beat experienced, established competitors on their own turf. An analysis of their business strategy is also required, to see how they created that competitive advantage.

Individual Immigrant Entrepreneurial Strategies

Dollinger's entrepreneurship framework for venture creation is based on the resource-based theory of sustained competitive advantage. "The resource-based theory is the most appropriate to understand new venture creation because it best describes how entrepreneurs themselves build their businesses from the resources and capabilities they currently possess or can realistically acquire. ... [It] argues that the choice of which industry to enter and what business to be in is not enough to ensure success. The theory says that the nature and quality of the resources, capabilities, and strategies the entrepreneur possesses and can acquire can lead to long-term success." (Dollinger, 2003, p. 10)

According to resource-based theory, entrepreneurs use resources that are:

- Rare

- Valuable
- Hard to copy
- Without quality substitutes that can obtain a sustainable competitive advantage

The Dutch migrant entrepreneurs indeed could access the required resources to achieve success against well-established competitors. As to the strategies, these can only be discerned in the biographies about Suzy van der Kwast, Willem Verryt and Bert ten Broeke as they provide enough information about their business ventures. The brief accounts in Schouten's overview of other Dutch entrepreneurs don't provide sufficient depth to establish whether there was something like a strategy behind their success.

Suzy found that certain aspects in business she had taken for granted in the Netherlands – areas in which she had received training and had gained skills – simply were missing or lacking here. Just like Ten Broeke, Groen and Verkerk, she spotted an opportunity. But an insight about a market opportunity is not a strategy. What she then had to do was build unique competitive advantage by persistently and consistently developing her business, focusing on what she excelled in, and satisfying her customer base around that specific way of doing things.

Suzy's entrepreneurial strategy was built around *Cultural Capital*. She consistently and persistently went to extreme lengths, at all times – in continually new, fresh and innovative ways – to create a sublime customer experience based on pure European style, sophistication and service.

You didn't just go to Suzy's for a coffee. You went there because you would step into an environment that exuded a certain unique something – architecture, art, spaciousness, buzz, rhythm, sounds, pizzazz, aromas, atmosphere. You could soak up another world for a few brief moments. A place where you were the most important person around, taken care of and highly esteemed, and treated with a smile and friendly respect, until it was time to move on. That's the kind of feel that was immortalised by Rita Angus. That was the brand personalised by Suzy. That's what you were happy to pay for – not just the perfect shot of caffeine and the decency of fresh food.

Willem Verryt was a totally different kettle of fish. There was no style or European sophistication attached to him. He was a man of action. He was a man who stood for decency, for what was right, and for humaneness. He cared for his fellow man. He believed in being and doing good. The unique feat that he accomplished, by creating retirement village Ons Dorp, was coincidental with the simple fact that he had been trained as a builder. He was a people person first.

Willem's entrepreneurial strategy was built around *Social Capital*. He used his finely honed people and leadership skills, and his large network of friends who completely trusted him and owed him loyalty, to unite a disparate group of Dutch people around a humanitarian goal of caring for the elderly, in a style that was decent, caring, complete and humane. Willem took advantage of his extensive network within the Dutch community and his solid

reputation for social engagement to organise a group initiative that led to the creation of one of the most advanced retirement villages of its day. He was a builder who built a community.

Bert ten Broeke was a strong individual. He was interested in the Dutch community because they understood him and spoke his language, and because they were his natural customer base. But the strengths around which he built and grew his business, were the vast amounts of knowledge, insights, expertise and intellectual property that he had relentlessly built up over the years with urgency and drive, a great sense of perfection and a never-ending need for efficiency.

Bert wanted to make money – lots of it – and he used his *Human Capital* to the utmost to achieve that, and that's why his business succeeded so well. He wanted to be a butcher ever since he was a child, a really good butcher just like his dad. He ultimately became one of the best in the new country that he adopted as his own. Along the way, Brook's helped to change an entire nation in the way it eats meat and titillates its taste buds.

Based on an analysis of Suzy, Willem and Bert's success, it appears that the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model may prove to be very useful to identify the presence of business strategies – matching the various key dimensions of the model – that lead to establishing competitive advantage and success. Can the same be said though, when entrepreneurship is analysed at a collective level rather than the individual level?

Collective Immigrant Entrepreneurial Strategies

Van Roon's work explores "Dutch Migrants in New Zealand Agriculture" (Van Roon, 1971), and his analysis allows an insight into whether the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model can also be applied to an entire industry, to see if it can help explain entrepreneurial success factors and business strategies.

Van Roon's thesis tested the hypothesis that: "Dutch migrant operated farms do not form a markedly distinctive element in New Zealand agriculture and that Dutch background is in no significant way reflected on these farms" (Van Roon, 1971, p. ii). He comes to the conclusion however that their Dutchness did have an influence on the farmer entrepreneurs' success, and that the Dutch did go about farming in different ways than their native born counterparts.

"What the Dutch have brought into most branches of New Zealand agriculture, was a state of mind rather than a transfer of agricultural practices. Coming from a harsh environment, they appreciated the opportunities available in New Zealand agriculture. Having the extra stimulus of being newly married, the desire to make good, meeting little discrimination and a background not unlike other New Zealanders, their capacity for work, which was their only asset, has got them where they are today. The way in which their farms are different from those run by other New Zealanders, can be traced first of all to their labour inputs, secondly

to their willingness to learn and thirdly to their being more budget or cost conscious. (Van Roon, 1971, p. 138)

Van Roon distinguishes between farmers who came from a farming background in the Netherlands, with the aim to pursue that same lifestyle in a more conducive environment than the post-war Netherlands, and those with an urban background who entered agriculture just like they would have explored any other appealing business opportunity. Both groups were entrepreneurs, but the latter probably more so.

Analysing Van Roon's findings, it appears that most of these entrepreneurs pursued business strategies that took advantage of the *Opportunity Structure* in New Zealand at that time. Sure, *Social Capital* played a role in their business set-up, as "in becoming farmers, the migrants have relied heavily on the labour provided by their wives and children, few even now employ non-family labour" (Van Roon, 1971, p. 137). But as was mentioned above, access to Social Capital within their own networks would not have played a large role in the success of Dutch immigrant entrepreneurs, which sets them apart from most other groups of migrants in New Zealand. It did happen on a smaller scale however, when Dutch share-milkers in the 1950s and 1960s used social networks of families, and in some cases friends, to access small sums of capital through personal loans. Farmers also accessed Dutch church networks where informal knowledge sharing took place and support was available, as well as a typically Dutch spirit of both jovial and jealous competition that in the case of the share-milkers spurred them on to higher performance so that they could become financially independent at the earliest possible date and get to purchase a farm of their own (Van Roon, 1971).

Similarly, their *Human Capital* also played a role in their success, as "Progress to farm ownership has generally been based on economic aggressiveness, self help and hard work... The Dutch rapidly became regarded as very desirable employees. They acquired a stereotyped image of being hardworking, conscientious and very creditworthy" (Van Roon, 1971, p. 137). But Van Roon also outlines how many Dutch farmers did not specifically have a background in farming.

The immigrants encountered *Constraints* which they needed to overcome, as "The migrants did not bring large amounts of capital from the Netherlands and they have not been assisted by the Dutch Government in any way whatsoever... High debt levels and social pressures forced the migrants on, to make extreme efforts to become self-employed, often at considerable sacrifice. Their rate of progress has generated some distrust and dislike, which in turn helped stimulate even further efforts" (Van Roon, 1971, p. 137).

But the one overriding dimension that comes through as the key enabler of strategies for Dutch agricultural success, seems to be the *Opportunity Structure* – in the dairy industry, horticulture and the poultry industry.

The Dutch would not have had such a major role in today's dairy industry, if it had not been for the opportunity to start out in share milking. A major constraint for the Dutch in getting

established on the land was their lack of capital – especially in the early days of the migration waves. The Dutch Government tried to restrict the outflow of capital, and the foreign exchange rules were that migrants could take £50 per adult (about 5 weeks of wages) and £20 per child. The Opportunity Structure the Dutch tapped into was the shortage of labour on farms, which the farmers tried to alleviate through sharemilking.

By providing their labour, a sharemilker could earn 29%, 39% or 50% of revenues from the milk, depending on their input and investments they could make in regard to machinery, resources, management etc. The higher the production levels, the higher the payout. Eventually – often within 5-10 years – the sharemilker would earn enough to afford a rundown farm somewhere, and build it up as their own. The entire family would help out, and often groups of relatives would help each other financially to get started, until they could stand on their own legs and pay back the debt.

For a newly arrived migrant, either with experience in farming, or with a dream of being their own boss, this system that required a minimal initial capital outlay was a dream come true. And the Dutch took to it like ducks to water.

The second Opportunity Structure the Dutch tapped into was the set up of the Egg Marketing Authority in 1953. This was a pioneering industry with a strong promise of growth, whereas only low start-up capital was required. Dutch migrants would buy a larger property on the edge of town, set up their first chicken coops and start a small poultry business, and then they would grow! Brink and Turk are two major examples of Dutch poultry farmers who hold a substantial share of the poultry market.

The third Opportunity Structure that was exploited was the rise in living standards which led to a growing demand for horticultural products. The Dutch knew the potential of those markets from their experience back home, and so they set up glass houses, orchards and even tulip fields in the south, and started growing tomatoes, cucumbers, apples (the creation of the Royal Gala!), flowers and a variety of vegetables.

“Dairying was attractive to the migrants because it was feasible to enter, as an operator, without any capital and then gradually work up via the agricultural ladder. Horticulture and poultry-farming were generally entered on a part-time basis on very small holdings often as a hobby... As capital accumulated and market potential was appreciated these holdings became full-time enterprises. Most of the migrants who entered these types of farming were not very familiar with them in the Netherlands. Economic opportunity in New Zealand and an awareness that there were better methods of doing things and the small amount of capital required were what attracted them into intensive farming.” (Van Roon, 1971, p. 136)

Van Roon clearly outlines how the Dutch just happened to be in the right place, at the right time. “The changes which took place in the 1960s in the poultry industry, ultimately leading to government controls being imposed, are partially due to the entry of the Dutch into this type of farming. If these controls had been in place at the time of the migrants arrival, few

would have been able to enter poultry farming because of the greater amount of capital now required.” (Van Roon, 1971, p. 133)

Conclusion

This paper set out to test the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model’s potential to act as a heuristic device to explain the experiences and success of Dutch migrant entrepreneurs, based on information available from secondary sources.

It appears that the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model can not only be applied at an individual level but also at the collective level. Key success factors like resources and capabilities as well as business strategies can be matched with key dimensions in the model – both at the agency level and the structure level. By doing so, the model brings clarity and helps to explain the phenomenon of Dutch migrant entrepreneurial success in New Zealand. Based on the available literature it would appear that Dutch immigrant entrepreneurs used resources, capabilities and strategies that were of a specific, essentially Dutch nature, and adapted and leveraged those in their new environment.

Based on the results from this research project, it appears that the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model will be useful to identify key success factors and the presence of specific migrant business strategies that lead to establishing competitive advantage and successful companies. The model helps to separate out specific migrant resources, capabilities and strategies, as it identifies the various dimensions of the business environment that all entrepreneurs are faced with, but also the specific dimensions of the environment encountered by the migrant entrepreneur. By identifying the additional complex elements of agency dimensions with regard to the migrant entrepreneur, and separating them from the agency and structure dimensions that are encountered by any entrepreneur, findings can be isolated and typical migrant success factors and strategies can be identified.

Due to the limited amount of available secondary sources though, this would need to be confirmed through additional primary research. Further study needs to be undertaken to establish whether a systematic application of the model could offer the burgeoning field of migrant entrepreneurship research new insights that may be relevant for policy makers in the fields of immigration and economic development.

By analysing through a Case Study approach which strategies were adopted and adapted over time by Dutch migrant entrepreneurs, it is expected that typically Dutch success factors can be identified. Should this indeed be the case, then it may well be possible that a strong argument can be put forward – at a generic level, for migrants from all nationalities – that their entrepreneurial strengths and unique attributes should be identified, and policies should be set out to encourage building and extending businesses based on those rare, valuable and hard to copy ethnic qualities, characteristics, capabilities and attributes.

In that case some answers may be found to the question posed by Dana in the 'Handbook of Research on Ethnic Entrepreneurship': "Are behaviour and ethnicity linked and, if so, how and why, and does it matter?" (Dana, 2007, p. 809). If there were typically Dutch behaviours that led to their notable successes in the New Zealand business environment, then the Immigrant Entrepreneur Environment Model will guide the research to deliver insights on the 'how and why'. Ultimately, these insights may be able to assist governmental and other bodies to set guidelines as to how destination countries can stimulate economic growth by encouraging migrant entrepreneurs to 'do it their way'.

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